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Dear Friends, 
 
The last year has brought economic turbulence unprecedented in most of our lifetimes, with ripple effects 
across both public and private sectors. Government in particular has been hard hit by declining revenues 
and an increased demand for services, amidst counter-intuitive increases in some seemingly endlessly 
rising costs like health care.  States across the nation are grappling with budget deficits and are forced to 
reinvent the way they do business or significantly pare back on services. At the beginning of this crisis, 
many observed – with a glimmer of hope– that challenging times like this can at least provide an opening 
for innovative system reform for which there is often little appetite during headier times. I suggest that 
while we never invite tough times, there can be a “utility of trouble” that can lead complex organizations 
like state government to refine its mission and improve its performance. 
 
This report, Priorities and Public Safety: Reentry and the Rising Costs of our Corrections System, 
prepared by the Crime and Justice Institute for the Boston Foundation as part of our Understanding 
Boston series, shows that several of our competitor states are taking advantage of the utility of trouble by 
reinventing their corrections systems in more innovative ways informed by data and best practices. This 
report finds that several states are enacting major policy changes to reduce the practice of incarceration 
and lower the cost of corrections. The result has been not only more cost-effective government, but also, 
even more importantly, improved public safety.  
 
In the 1990s, Massachusetts and other states jumped on a “get tough on crime” bandwagon that did not 
necessarily lead to improved outcomes. Corrections budgets nationally and locally have exploded over the 
past twenty years at the expense of other investments. For example, this report shows that over the past 
ten years our major corrections budgets enjoyed double digit growth while our Higher Education budget 
was cut by 7.5%. This disparity might be justified if we could point to a greater need or improved 
outcomes as a result of that disproportionate investment in corrections. But during that period the prison 
population remained constant as did most recidivism indicators.  
 
This report offers a roadmap for how Massachusetts might adopt more cost-effective – and more 
performance-effective – approaches to corrections amidst the current budget crisis.  
 
This roadmap represents the latest partnership between the Boston Foundation and the Crime and Justice 
Institute, building on our recent reports, task force, and advocacy around CORI reform. As with our 
efforts around CORI, we seek to frame our examination of the state’s corrections systems and 
opportunities to promote more innovative approaches and cost-effectiveness not only as a public safety 
but also an economic competitiveness concern. As with our shared work on CORI reform, we expect this 
issue to be of interest to a wide range of business, civic, and other stakeholders beyond those specializing 
in corrections, as our public safety systems – and our fiscal health as a Commonwealth – have a direct 
impact on us all. I invite you to read this report and join with us in considering the recommendations put 
forward. 
 
Paul S. Grogan 
President and CEO, The Boston Foundation 
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Executive Summary 
 
As the national economic crisis continues to ripple across state governments, with most states 
moving to deeply cut vital services, there is a renewed interest in directing resources toward 
those practices and policies that are most effective and efficient.  State budget-writers are 
increasingly examining the performance of departments, agencies, vendors, individuals and 
services to determine which are producing outcomes that deserve continued funding and which 
are not.  The fact that corrections agencies are being scrutinized indicates the seriousness of the 
budget crisis.   
 
Historically, corrections agencies have been able to avoid deep budget cuts in bad economic 
times and obtain significant budget increases in normal economic periods. As a result, 
corrections budgets nationally have increased nearly 300 percent over the past 20 years.  The 
current economic crisis, though, has altered this trend and forced many states to abandon the 
practices and policies that triggered prison expansion and mounting corrections budgets.   
 
As in other states, Massachusetts criminal justice budgets have risen dramatically.  Over the past 
10 years corrections budgets have grown at a faster rate than the budgets of almost any other 
state service including Public Health, Higher Education and Local Aid.  Adjusted for inflation:* 
 The Department of Correction budget has increased more than 12%; 
 The County Sheriffs’ budget (in aggregate) has increased more than 20%; and  
 The Probation budget has increased more than 160%.   
 
On the other hand, over the same period: 
 The Public Health budget has decreased 3 percent; 
 The Higher Education budget has decreased 7.5%: and 
 The Local Aid budget has decreased nearly 1%. 
 
Massachusetts is in the midst of a serious budget crisis due to declining revenues, leading 
government officials to make deep cuts to services that Massachusetts normally takes pride in 
providing.  Budgets for vital state services will receive significantly fewer resources than in 
previous years, leading to fewer services and more costs to individual users and municipalities.  
For FY10: 
 The Higher Education budget is reduced by 17%; 
 Public Health is reduced by 13%; and 
 Local Aid is reduced by 28%. 
 
Yet, the budget crisis has not led to similar reductions in the corrections budgets:  
 The Department of Correction budget was reduced by just 1.9%; 
 The County Sheriffs budget was reduced by 8%; 
 The Probation Department was reduced by 8%; and 
 The Parole Board was reduced by less than 2.5%. 
 
Rising corrections budgets can often be justified if prison and jail populations increase 
significantly or if public safety outcomes (such as reduced recidivism rates) improve.  Yet,  
                                                 
* See Appendix A for full budget information and see Appendix B for references and citations for budget data. This 
data does not reflect pending “9c” cuts to the FY10 budget. 
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neither of these circumstances appears to be the case in Massachusetts.  Over the 10-year period 
from 1998 to 2008, corrections budgets experienced disproportionate growth while corrections 
populations largely remained constant, rising less then 5 percent overall.   
 
Public safety outcomes are more difficult to measure because Massachusetts corrections agencies 
have no uniform method of data collection and information sharing.  However key indicators, 
such as recidivism reduction and the number of parole revocations and probation surrenders that 
indicate failure rates of released ex-offenders, show little change over the same 10-year period. 
 
The Commonwealth’s economic circumstances are similar to virtually every other state in the 
country.  But in many of these states, growing corrections budgets have led to a closer 
examination of the return on investment in a growing corrections infrastructure as well as the 
policies triggering this growth.   
 
Several states have taken a decidedly different approach than Massachusetts.  They are making 
major policy shifts, based on research and outcomes from other states, to shrink the cost of 
corrections, reduce the use of incarceration for lower-risk offenders and improve public safety.  
The states that already have had initiatives in place have reduced their prison populations, 
focused resources on those most likely to re-offend and saved millions of dollars – helping to 
offset budgetary impacts on other state services.  Michigan for example, has closed 13 
corrections facilities and saved $500 million since it began a corrections reform initiative in 
2003.  It has also continued to see reduced levels of re-offending. 
 
Massachusetts cannot expect to take the budgetary steps that a state like Michigan has taken this 
year, but it must begin, based on models that have proven to reduce recidivism and improve 
public safety, to build a system that produces results.  Possible solutions include: 
 
 Make the reduction of recidivism the collective goal of the criminal justice system. 
 Establish uniform data collection and information sharing.  
 Science should guide policy-making. 
 Examine laws and practices that restrict access to supervised reentry programs in the 
community for non-violent individuals. 
 Collaborate with multiple stakeholders in the communities to which prisoners return and 
use the existing community capacity to improve reentry outcomes and reduce the risk of 
re-offense. 
 Reconsider resource allocations that direct significant resources to prison and jail 
infrastructure and proportionally far fewer resources to programs and services that are 
proven to reduce recidivism. 
 Direct corrections resources to managing and preparing higher-risk prisoners for 
successful transition into the community. 
 
The Commonwealth can begin to construct a more efficient and effective corrections system that 
will lead to lower prison and jail populations, a less expensive corrections system and improved 
public safety outcomes with fewer ex-prisoners returning to crime.  The budget crisis presents a 
rare opportunity to look closely at our corrections system and ensure that the public’s 
considerable investment is achieving results.  
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Introduction 
 
“Safety at any price” 
For decades, this has been the motto guiding the criminal justice system. Recognizing the 
importance of public safety to individuals and its influence on other areas of civil society, 
government officials have traditionally been willing to create policies that protect the public and 
others that only have the veneer of safety.  Such policies are often expensive and budgets are 
increased to accommodate growing corrections populations.   
 
Yet, in the current economic climate, the cost of corrections and, likewise, the policies that have 
led to high corrections populations are being closely examined.  The momentum behind this 
fiscal analysis has led many states to alter their approach to policies that influence corrections 
budgets as well as examine the outcomes expected from a criminal justice system.  Across the 
country, states are reconsidering stringent sentencing laws, limitations on community 
supervision, the length of incarceration and the necessity of new prison construction to address 
overcrowded conditions. 
 
Along with the rest of the country, Massachusetts is in the midst of an economic crisis that 
necessitates cuts to vital state services and increased taxes to limit the impact of the cuts.  
Because budgets for corrections departments have grown at a faster rate than just about any other 
department in the state, an examination of the Massachusetts corrections system is appropriate to 
understand whether taxpayer money is being spent effectively. 
 
The criminal justice system in Massachusetts is a fairly complex structure with several systems 
operating within it.  The corrections departments, the court system, and law enforcement 
agencies all make up the criminal justice system.  This report focuses on the corrections 
departments.  These agencies – the Department of Correction and the Sheriffs Departments, 
which manage offenders in corrections facilities, and the Probation Department and Parole 
Board, which manage and supervise offenders in the community – have a large responsibility to 
reduce an offender’s threat to re-offend and to protect the public from dangerous offenders.   
 
These twin responsibilities are often in conflict because of statutory limitations and budget 
restrictions.  Restrictive sentencing and parole laws limit the ability of corrections agencies to 
prepare and release appropriate offenders to the community.  Because an overwhelming 
percentage of corrections resources is directed to infrastructure – expensive buildings and 
thousands of state and county employees – it is very difficult for corrections officials to shift 
resources to programs and services that reduce recidivism and improve public safety.  In a 
budget crisis, these programs are cut even further which the research shows adversely impacts 
public safety with unprepared offenders returning to the community.  
 
The circumstances in the corrections agencies and the state’s budget crisis compelled the Boston 
Foundation and the Crime and Justice Institute, a division of Community Resources for Justice, 
to examine the corrections system and the recent trends in policies that are affected by growing 
corrections spending.  Earlier Boston Foundation and Crime and Justice Institute collaborations 
examined the Criminal Offender Record Information system.  This work provided clarity and 
momentum behind efforts to reform the use of, access to and understanding of criminal records 
and the broader policy implications of economic and workforce development and public safety.  
The current examination has relied on several sources of information, most of them available to  
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the public, as well as discussions and documents from various stakeholders in state and local 
government associated with either corrections or the budget and legislative processes.   
 
The findings in this report suggest that the massive growth in corrections spending over the past 
10 years has not been driven by equal growth in the corrections population or in improved public 
safety outcomes.  The questions raised by these findings revolve around the state’s willingness to 
pay nearly any amount for criminal justice policies currently in place without evidence of better 
outcomes.   
 
Is the public willing to accept significant cuts to other state and local services while corrections 
agencies receive minimal budget reductions?  As important: should the actions of other states to 
reform similarly expensive criminal justice policies inform Massachusetts lawmakers in 
reconsidering past policies and the direction of its criminal justice system? 
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The State of Corrections in Massachusetts 
 
In 2009, Massachusetts spent more than $1.2 billion1 on corrections including prisons, jails, 
probation and parole.  This was more than any other state service budget except Local Aid ($1.3 
billion) and the Department of Education ($4.5 billion).  Massachusetts spent more incarcerating 
people than it did on the budgets for Higher Education, the Department of Public Health and the 
Department of Social Services.   
 
The corrections budgets are the result of a decade-long expansion and they significantly exceed 
the growth rates of nearly all other state services.  A review of the Fiscal Year 19982 and Fiscal 
Year 20083 state budgets indicate an unusually vigorous commitment to a growing corrections 
infrastructure that has few equals in other areas of state government.  The questions then arise: 
what has driven these budget increases, and are we safer because of them? 
Percent Change;  FY98 & FY08 MA State Budgets
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*Data in this graph has not been adjusted for inflation.  See graph on next page for inflation-adjusted data. 
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*Data in this graph has been adjusted for inflation.4 
 
 
Factors causing increased corrections budgets 
The past decade in Massachusetts shows large budget increases for prisons and jails and fairly 
minimal budget increases for most other vital services.  Given these increases, it is reasonable to 
assume that the increased budgets were triggered by large increases in prison and jail populations 
or that the state is receiving significant public safety benefits in the form of reduced recidivism, 
fewer crimes and fewer victims. 
 
Did a sudden rise in the prison and jail population account for the increased corrections budget? 
Budget increases are often driven by increases in the prison population.  A logical assumption 
might be that growth in the Massachusetts corrections budgets was driven by an equivalent 
increase in the corrections population.  A review of historic corrections population trends does 
not support this connection.  The period of significant population growth occurred primarily 
between 1980 and the mid-1990s when the population in the Department of Correction† 
soared nearly 300 percent from 2,8675 to 10,6946 and the population in the sheriffs’ departments‡ 
increased from 2,6547 to 11,1528.  However, in the 10-year period between 1998 and 2008 when 
corrections budgets grew substantially both the prison and jail populations have remained 
relatively static, rising only about five percent in the 10-year period.   
                                                 
† The Department of Correction incarcerates prisoners serving sentences greater than 2 ½ years. 
‡ The Sheriffs Departments incarcerate, in Houses of Correction, prisoners serving sentences up to 2 ½ years in 
length. 
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Massachusetts Inmate Growth: Prison System
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The growth in the corrections budget does not appear to have been a response to overcrowding in 
the corrections system.  Overcrowding has continued to be a problem for both county jails and 
the state prison system.  Data9 indicate that in 1990 the population in the prisons was 60% above 
capacity and county jails were 50% above capacity.  In 1998, the prisons were 38% above 
capacity and the jails were 50% above capacity.  And in 2008, the prisons were 44% above 
capacity and the jails were 61% above capacity.  These figures indicate that overcrowding has 
been an unsolved problem in the corrections system for nearly 20 years despite the size of the 
corrections budgets and the fluctuation of the incarcerated population. 
 
Community corrections agencies have experienced almost no growth in the supervised 
population.  In fact, the parole caseload has declined over the 10-year period and the Probation 
Department’s risk/needs caseload10 has also declined although the total probation population 
increased due to a caseload transfer from the district court.  A comparison of the 1998 and 2008 
corrections populations shows: 
 The incarcerated population in the Department of Correction increased about 5% from 
10,915 to 11,400.11 
 The combined incarcerated population in the Sheriffs’ Departments increased about 11% 
12,531 to 13,965.12 
 The parole population actually decreased about 5% from 8,326 to 7,893.13 
 The FY1999 probation population decreased for probationers on risk/needs supervision 
nearly 14% from 64,016 to 55,064.14  The overall probation population increased, but the 
majority of the increase was an administrative probation caseload for low-risk offenders 
and juveniles transferred from the district court to the Probation Department in 200415 
along with an $80 million budget increase. 
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*FY98 Figures adjusted by a 32.1% inflation rate - based on the Annual Average CPI-U for 1998 (163.0) and 2008 (215.303). 
Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
**Caseload change in 2008 does not include 80,507 cases on administrative supervision in the district court and does not 
include the Probate and Family category. 
**2008 budget adjusted to account for 2004 district court budget transfer of $81 million. 
 
 The growth of the incarcerated population over the past ten years has been minimal and in some 
cases there has been a reduction in the supervised population.  In the face of continuing budget 
deficits policy makers and government officials should question whether, absent evidence of a 
public safety reason for budget growth, the significant budget increases are justified.   
 
Has more money reduced re-offenses among ex-offenders and improved public safety? 
Understandably, the public and policy makers are willing to spend significant resources in order 
to ensure the safety of residents.  Protecting the public is a priority of government, whether local, 
state or federal.  High crime rates affect all aspects of public and private life from health and 
education to economic development.  Thus, government’s role in protecting the public is bound 
to have a budgetary impact. 
 
Yet, the growth of Massachusetts corrections budgets has not been matched by corresponding 
public safety outcomes.  The criminal justice system has various responsibilities including 
protecting the public, holding offenders responsible for their criminal acts, incapacitating those 
requiring prison or jail and reducing the risk ex-offenders pose when they return to the 
community.  For measuring the public safety benefits of the corrections system, recognized 
outcomes include the rate of recidivism16 and the number of revocations and surrenders.  Thus 
collecting and analyzing these data points is necessary to determine the impact of corrections  
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policies on public safety and whether they are successful in reducing the risk of re-offending 
posed by ex-offenders. 
 Department of Correction data show that the recidivism rate has fluctuated between 42 
percent (1998) and 39 percent (2002).17  The DOC has no data for offenders released 
after 2002. 
 The Sheriffs’ Departments do not report aggregate recidivism data and only a few 
sheriffs appear to track recidivism.  There is insufficient data from 1998 to compare 
with more recent data.   
o The most recent data show that recidivism for county jail inmates averages 50 
percent within 1 year of release.18   
 Parole data indicate that: 
o In 1998, 10 percent of the parole grants were revoked, with 793 revocations due 
to either a new crime or a technical violation.19 
o In 2008, 11 percent of parole grants were revoked, totaling 900 revocations.20 
 Probation data indicate that: 
o In 1998, there were 58,622 surrenders.21 
o In 2008, there were 56,654 surrenders.22 
 
The data show that despite the significant increases in corrections spending little has changed 
with regard to the offender’s likelihood of success once released.  Between 40 and 50 percent of 
offenders released from correctional supervision are back in trouble again within three years.  
These numbers, when available, are fairly consistent over the past 10 years.  The notion of 
corrections agencies ‘correcting’ behavior does not appear to have been an outcome affected by 
increased spending.  Under the current fiscal crisis, it is reasonable to question whether the 
corrections budget growth is justified given the limited public safety improvement as illustrated 
by relatively limited reentry success. 
 
What did the corrections budgets pay for? 
To a certain degree, we know what some of the budget increases supported.  A 2005 report titled 
Strengthening Public Safety, Increasing Accountability and Instituting Fiscal Responsibility in 
the Department of Correction,23 examined the state prison system including its budget decisions.  
It found that corrections budgets have very high fixed and personnel costs.  “Cost increases result 
primarily from the rising costs of labor, including overtime and collective bargaining.  Between 
1995 and 2003, staffing expenditures increased from $200 million to $312 million, a 56% 
increase.”24  The staff costs increased to $363 million in the FY 2008 budget.25  The report found 
that the Department of Correction had the second highest staff to inmate ratio in the country and 
correctional officers were the third highest paid in the country.26   
 
Staffing data from other corrections agencies was not available and it is difficult to determine 
what the increased budgets for many of the sheriffs’ departments and the Probation Department 
covered.  The Parole Board, which experienced the smallest increase of the four corrections 
agencies, directed budget increases to the development of eight Regional Reentry Centers during 
this 10-year period.  These centers provide treatment services, connections to other service 
providers and basic services that help stabilize recently released inmates.   
 
Corrections Budgets in an Economic Crisis27 
Over the past year, Massachusetts, like the rest of the country, has seen its revenues plummet, its 
unemployment rate rise, and the state budget deficit climb above $4 billion.  In the grip of an 
economic meltdown, Massachusetts lawmakers had little choice but to make many difficult and,  
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in some cases, devastating budget cuts in order to close the budget gap.  Like most other 
accounts, corrections budgets were reduced and services were cut. 
 
 The DOC budget was cut by 1.9% 
 The Sheriffs’ Departments’ budget (collectively) was cut by 8.8% 
 The Parole Board budget was cut by 2.4% 
 The Probation Department budget was cut by 8.3% 
 
While corrections budgets were reduced less than 9 percent, other vital state services received 
budget cuts that will mean diminished resources for cities and towns, limited services from 
agencies providing mental health services, care for seniors and children living in poverty – and 
higher costs to attend public colleges.   
 
 The Public Health budget was cut 13.6% 
 The Higher Education budget was cut 17.2% 28 
 The Local Aid budget was cut 28.3%29 
 
2010 MA State Budget Cuts
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Over the past several years, there has been limited attention to the financial impact of the 
growing criminal justice system and the budget choices made to support corrections expansion.  
Admittedly, examining such impacts during flush fiscal times attracts little interest given the 
willingness of taxpayers and lawmakers to expend considerable resources for public safety.  But 
in difficult economic times, budget decisions that result in reductions to vital services compel a 
closer examination of the fiscal circumstances and public safety outcomes of our criminal justice 
system.   
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The public is willing to pay for public safety and political leaders recognize this.  Most troubling 
though is that while tax dollars are directed to growing corrections budgets, there does not appear 
to be the measurable benefits the public would expect for the investment.  Rising corrections 
costs might be acceptable if public safety is improved, if the corrections system is run efficiently 
and transparently, and if recidivism is reduced.  Growing corrections budgets would probably be 
acceptable if the prison population grew substantially in response to higher crime rates.  Yet, 
none of these are what drove the growth of the corrections budget over the past 10 years.   
 
The structural and political difficulties of such reductions are obvious.  Because the corrections 
system relies on large and expensive physical structures, real savings will not be realized until 
units of a prison or jail or a whole facility are closed.  Closing a prison or jail means either 
reducing the flow of offenders coming into prisons and jails, reducing the amount of time they 
spend locked up, or both.  People want to feel safe and the political dynamics of these options are 
difficult to accept, even in an economic crisis.  Yet, across the country, states are looking at the 
same budgetary abyss that Massachusetts is facing and taking a decidedly different approach to 
corrections spending and policies affecting sentencing, early release and supervision. 
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The National Picture 
The United States now incarcerates 2.3 million of its adult citizens in prisons and jails across the 
country, far more than any other country in the world.30  Another 5 million people are being 
supervised by probation or parole.31  Combined, more than 7 million people in the United States, 
or one in 31 adults are under correctional supervision.32   
 
The growth of the prison system throughout the country has been extraordinary, increasing by 
700 percent between 1970 and 2005.33   In 1987, there were fewer than 600,000 people in prisons 
in the United States.  In 2007, there were nearly 1.6 million people in prisons with another 
700,000 in local jails.34   
 
During this period of growth, 
strict sentencing laws swept 
the country, prisons were 
built to house the growing 
number of incarcerated 
individuals serving longer 
sentences, and corrections 
budgets rose to meet the urge 
to incarcerate.  Laws and 
policies limiting judicial 
discretion, such as three 
strikes and mandatory 
minimum sentences for drug 
offenses, were very popular 
in Congress and in state 
legislatures across the country.  Laws limiting or in many cases eliminating parole were equally 
popular.  In the mid-1990s, the Truth in Sentencing Act was passed by Congress, requiring states 
to change sentencing laws so that violent offenders serve at least 85 percent of their sentences.35  
By the end of the 1990s most offenders, violent and non-violent, were serving longer periods in 
prison. 
 
This growth has caused 
corrections budgets at all 
levels to swell.  In 1982, 
corrections budgets across 
the country totaled $9 billion.  
By 2007, corrections budgets 
had increased to $44 
billion.36   
 
Despite the rising cost of 
corrections, the public does 
not appear to be getting the 
public safety benefits it 
expects.  Rates of recidivism 
have continued to reflect widespread failure of the criminal justice system in changing offender 
behavior.  Across the country, recidivism rates exceed 50 percent.  Thus, despite a massive  
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increase in prison construction in order to house more than two million people, state and federal 
leaders have not built a sustainable structure for preparing offenders to return to the community 
and become productive 
members of society.  
The lack of planning 
has, according to recent 
research, led to the 
probability that our 
corrections population 
and corresponding 
expenditures will 
continue to rise for the 
next several years.37 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic impact of correctional budgets and policies across the country 
Criminal justice policies are frequently triggered by emotional reactions to high profile incidents.  
These policies are often maintained, despite their ineffectiveness, because of a lack of political 
will to challenge soft-on-crime demagoguery.  Budget crises present an opportunity to change 
such policies despite the political risk because the public is more focused on wasteful 
government spending.  Nowhere is this more evident than in corrections and sentencing policy 
and many states are taking this opportunity to reform expensive and ineffective policies.  Below 
are several examples of states that implemented policies using evidence-based practices to 
reduce recidivism, improve public safety and create long-term cost savings. 
 
Michigan – Six years ago Michigan began reforming its corrections system to require evidence-
based programs for inmates returning to the community and to increase reliance on community 
supervision rather than long prison terms.   
 The success of the reentry initiative has resulted in fewer offenders re-offending and fewer 
parolees returning to prison. 
 Over the past two years the prison population has declined 7%.38   
 Parole revocations have declined 42% as the parole population has increased 40%.39 
 The reduction in the prison population and the success of the new parole initiatives has 
allowed the state, since 2003, to close 13 corrections facilities and save $500 million.40 
 Despite this year’s budget deficits and deep cuts, the Governor and legislature, recognizing 
the important public safety outcomes that have occurred, doubled the funding for the 
evidence-based reentry initiatives and for community supervision.41 
 
Kansas – A 2006 study of the incoming prison population found that nearly 65 percent of new 
prison admissions were offenders who had violated the terms of their previous release while on 
probation or parole at a cost of $53 million annually.42  As the prison population grew, the need 
to construct new prisons to accommodate the population also grew and policy makers projected 
that it would cost $80 million in prison construction to address the growing population.  Kansas 
tried another option since it did not appear that the current policies were reducing crime or 
violations.  
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 Kansas reformed its community supervision process so that probation officers were 
encouraged to keep offenders with non-criminal violations in the community using graduated 
sanctions. 
 Lawmakers instituted a measure requiring a 20% reduction in probationers sent to prison for 
violating release conditions.43 
 Lawmakers used financial incentives for counties to adopt evidence-based practices to reduce 
the rate of probation revocations.44 
 Lawmakers restored earned time credits for nonviolent offenders and established 60-day 
credit programs for inmates completing education and substance abuse programs.45 
 In the past three years of the program, parole revocations have dropped 48%. 
 Kansas has closed three prison units and a cell house, saving $34 million, and officials 
anticipate they will avoid more than $80 million in additional corrections costs.46 
 
Connecticut – Like many states, Connecticut had serious prison overcrowding and despite a 
massive prison construction spree of 12 new prisons and an increased capacity of 50 percent by 
the mid-1990s, the prison system was overcrowded within three years.47  This led the 
Department of Corrections to send prisoners to other states, another significant drain on their 
budget.  Recognizing that these were short-term fixes, state lawmakers instituted new policies in 
2004 designed to slow the inmate population and reduce the growing costs of corrections while 
also reducing recidivism rates.   
 The law required a 20 percent reduction in parole and probation revocations.48 
 All inmates housed out-of-state were returned to Connecticut facilities. 
 The community supervision law was amended requiring all eligible inmates be released to 
community supervision prior to the completion of their sentences.49 
 The law required the state to develop a reentry plan for all inmates leaving state custody to 
reduce recidivism.50 
 As the incarcerated population began to decline, $13 million in savings was redirected to 
community-based strategies to reduce recidivism and improve public safety.51 
 Reinvested funds enabled the Probation Department to implement a violation-reduction 
program and a program focused on intensive treatment and supervision for violators that 
would have otherwise been re-incarcerated.52 
 In another act, lawmakers established a policy and planning division responsible for: 
collecting data from various criminal justice agencies; tracking information and trends; 
analyzing the system and effectiveness of the reforms; and recommending improvements.53 
 Due to the success of the Probation initiatives, especially with higher-risk probationers, 
revocation rates also decreased by 20 percent.54 
 The prison population has declined 4% and the rate of prison admissions has declined 12% 
since 2008.55 
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Other States – budget-related, evidence-based reforms:56 
 
In an effort to reduce supervision costs and focus resources on supervising those at higher 
risk to re-offend: 
Virginia Now requires judges to remove offenders from community supervision who have been 
supervised for at least two years and have satisfied all of the supervision conditions 
except restitution, fines, or costs. 
Washington Eliminated supervised probation of people convicted of misdemeanors and some low-
level felonies. 
Texas Reduced the maximum probation terms for people convicted of certain property or 
drug offenses from 10 years to 5 years. 
 
 
After years of tough-on-crime laws such as mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
offenses, three-strikes laws and restrictive parole eligibility guidelines, many states are 
rolling some of these measures back in an effort to shorten periods of confinement and 
place lower-risk inmates in community-based settings: 
Colorado Increased earned time for eligible inmates from 10 to 12 days per month and also allows 
early parole release of 60 days for certain offenders. 
Oregon Increased the amount of earned time people may accumulate from 20 percent of their 
sentence to 30 percent of their sentence. 
New York Eliminated certain mandatory minimum drug sentences, known as the Rockefeller 
Laws.  It also expanded eligibility for early parole for those inmates with significant 
medical needs. 
Washington Established a new medical parole policy which allows early release for inmates who are 
55 years or older and are chronically or terminally ill. 
Pennsylvania Adopted sentencing options for low-level offenders who are likely to receive a sentence 
of imprisonment but who can opt for a shorter sentence that combines participation and 
completion of an intense risk reduction program in prison with an earlier release date so 
long as institutional behavior has been satisfactory. 
Maryland Restored parole eligibility for mandatory minimum drug sentences. 
Nevada Repealed mandatory minimum sentencing enhancements for certain offenses. 
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What works to reduce recidivism? 
In order to reduce recidivism, the criminal justice system must improve offender reentry 
outcomes.  Successful reentry means fewer ex-offenders returning to criminal activity.  Recent 
research makes clear that effective reentry uses scientific methods to identify the risk of re-
offense posed by an offender and the interventions that will reduce that risk.  Decision-making 
for security, program and treatment participation, and community supervision is guided by the 
results of these methods.  Such assessments occur throughout the phases of the criminal justice 
process and assist in placing offenders under supervision commensurate with their risk and 
needs. 
 
In most cases, each phase of the process is managed by a single entity; for instance the judicial 
branch sentences the offender and the department of corrections or county corrections agencies 
manage the offender’s period of incarceration, yet each phase is linked to the others with regard 
to offender reentry.  See Appendix C for a reentry flow chart showing the stages and practices 
supported by research. 
 
Diversion – Research shows that most non-violent offenders can be effectively managed in the 
community, without incarceration, so long as proven, evidence-based programs are part of the 
supervision.  The diversion of low-risk offenders from either trial (pre-trial diversion) or 
incarceration (jail diversion) is usually decided by the court and involves diverting the offender 
to structured treatment and supervision programs, prior to any significant involvement with the 
criminal justice system.  The goals of diversion include avoiding the cost of a jail bed for low-
risk offenders, putting offenders in community-based programs to address underlying problems 
like substance abuse and mental health issues, and reducing the stigmatizing effects of a criminal 
conviction or imprisonment.57   
 
Sentencing – Sentences should not limit the ability of corrections professionals to prepare an 
offender to reenter society.  A court should recognize that the offender will return to the 
community and that the sentence imposed will have an impact on how prepared the offender is to 
constructively return to society.  The laws should reflect the research and reduce the barriers to 
effective reentry preparation.  Cognizant of these findings, many states are taking steps to 
mitigate the damaging effects of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses, limitations on 
low-security placements, like halfway houses, and restrictions on community supervision 
through parole and probation. 
 
Incarceration – With 97 percent of the incarcerated population eventually returning to the 
community, the objective must be to reduce the risk that an ex-offender will return to crime.  
While prison or jail is designed to separate prisoners from society for a period, it should also 
change behaviors and attitudes that create the risk to public safety.   This requires that risk 
assessments be conducted to determine the inmate’s crime-inducing risks; that evidence-based 
programs and treatment interventions be applied to reduce these risks; that a case plan be  
developed and followed throughout incarceration; and that preparation for reentry be initiated 
early to assist the inmate in adjusting to reintegration.  Given the amount of money it costs to 
incarcerate an individual, not reducing the risks that led the offender to crime and eventually to 
prison is fiscally irresponsible. 
 
Post-Release Supervision – Offenders returning to the community are either released with 
supervision (parole or probation) or are released unconditionally, without supervision.  Research 
shows that supervision and treatment should be targeted to higher risk offenders being released  
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into the community.58  The research also shows that for low-risk offenders, supervision and 
interventions should be minimal and offenders should be discharged as quickly as possible.59 
 
Whether they are ready or not, low-risk or high-risk, almost all prisoners will be released at some 
point.  Therefore, while it may seem reasonable for a parole board to deny parole to a higher-risk 
offender, it is neither good for the safety of public nor fiscally prudent to keep such offenders 
locked up until the end of their sentence and then released without supervision.  The placement 
of higher risk offenders on supervision with appropriate treatment and support improves the 
likelihood that the person will successfully transition into the community.   
 
Transition to the Community – The community can be a resource for a returning offender or it 
can lead to the offender’s failure and return to imprisonment.  Community resources must be 
capable of continuing the treatment and support that began in prison.  The criminal justice 
system must involve community service providers and local municipal leaders to ensure 
sufficient resources are available to reduce the risk of recidivism.  Recidivism means a return to 
anti-social behavior, either in the form of a new crime or behavior that violates release 
conditions, and this behavior almost always occurs in the community to which the offender 
returns.  The reentry process owes the community more than the return of poorly-equipped 
offenders who will continue to destabilize the community.   
 
Barriers to Effective Correctional Outcomes in Massachusetts 
There are several reasons that Massachusetts has not had the public safety outcomes that a 
correctional system should produce.  Many of these are beyond the control of corrections 
agencies and have been created through legislation or regulation.  The most significant include: 
 
 Sentencing laws – Over the past several years the Massachusetts Legislature has passed laws 
requiring mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses, set longer prison and jail 
sentences for non-violent offenses, and prohibited individuals convicted of certain offenses 
from participating in work release and halfway houses.   These changes contributed to a huge 
increase in the prison and jail population.  Currently there are 31 drug offenses that require 
mandatory minimum sentences and nearly 2,000 inmates are housed in the prison system as a 
result (not including the county jail system).60  At $47,000 a year per prison inmate and 
mandatory minimum sentences ranging from two years to 10 years the cost of such a punitive 
policy is significant. 
 Community supervision laws and policies – Inmates serving prison sentences are not eligible 
for parole until they have served at least two-thirds of the maximum sentence no matter how 
good their conduct has been.   And inmates serving mandatory minimum drug sentences are 
not eligible for parole at all.  While this might seem appropriate, many inmates use their time 
in prison constructively and are prepared to move back to the community under the 
supervision of a parole officer earlier than currently allowed.  Continuing to incarcerate these 
inmates is expensive and unnecessary.  Restrictive sentencing and parole eligibility laws 
have also contributed to the nearly 40 percent of ex-offenders who are unsupervised 
immediately after release.61  
 Collaboration – Massachusetts corrections agencies historically have been prime examples of 
a silo mentality.  Recently, some departments have voluntarily committed to working 
together, although this is not widespread.  The lack of collaboration has created redundancy, 
wasted resources and made systemic policy improvements very difficult to implement. 
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 Data Collection - Massachusetts does not have uniform data collection or information sharing 
requirements for its 
criminal justice agencies 
or its corrections 
agencies.  A key factor in 
evaluating the 
effectiveness of 
corrections programs and 
spending decisions is 
recidivism data, yet there 
is no uniform definition 
of recidivism, making 
collection and evaluation 
impossible.  Uniform 
data collection practices 
would enhance the 
criminal justice system’s 
efficiency and accuracy.  
The lack of uniform data 
collection limits 
transparency and restricts 
outcome-based budget 
and policy decisions. 
 
Highlights in 
Massachusetts Corrections 
Practice 
 
Throughout the corrections 
system, involving 
community supervision 
agencies and prisons and 
jails, there are very positive 
signs of progress, best and 
promising practices, and 
recognition that the future 
should be guided by what 
works to reduce recidivism. 
 
The Hampden County 
Sheriff’s Department has 
consistently collected and 
reported recidivism data for 
several years and recent data 
continue to show positive 
outcomes.  The rate of 
recidivism has steadily 
declined since 2001 when the 
one-year recidivism rate was  
 
A number of bills currently before the Massachusetts legislature seek to 
address some of the challenges in the criminal justice system.  However, 
there is a significant question about the direction these bills will take the 
Commonwealth and whether they will make the system more or less 
effective and efficient.  Given the state of the economy, the legislative 
session has been dominated by whether new laws and regulations will reduce 
or increase the state’s expenditures.  However, the public discussion around 
the criminal justice measures has not triggered the same degree of fiscal 
scrutiny.  The issues underlying these bills are not new and, as with previous 
attempts, success largely depends on the legislature’s willingness to enter the 
criminal justice fray so close to an election.   
 
These issues include: 
 
Sentencing Reform – several bills related to changing some aspect of the 
sentencing laws are on the docket, many of which have been filed for several 
sessions of the legislature.  The most prominent of these bills would allow 
parole for prisoners serving mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
offenses, reducing the impact of mandatory minimum drug sentences on 
transfers to community supervision, and another that would dramatically 
increase the penalties for a third superior court conviction whether the crime 
is violent and serious or non-violent. 
 
CORI Reform – the issue of CORI reform has received significant attention 
from the legislature.  Over the last few sessions, several bills have been filed 
and well-attended public hearings have occurred with no legislative changes 
in the CORI laws.  However, recently the Governor issued an Executive 
Order and followed up with new regulations altering the hiring practices for 
departments and vendors in the Executive Office of Health and Human 
Services.  The current CORI bills in the legislature seek changes to the 
degree of access users of criminal record information currently have and the 
information available on a criminal record.  They also seek to improve the 
process for obtaining criminal record information by streamlining access, 
improving accuracy and greatly shortening the waiting period for a record.  
The Governor’s bill makes wholesale changes to the CORI system and 
purports to raise revenue. 
 
Post-release Supervision – this issue has been before the legislature 
previously and is prominent among policy makers because it seeks to 
supervise everyone released from a state prison under the belief that all ex-
prisoners require some kind of supervision after release.  The mandatory 
post-release supervision bills add a period of supervision onto the sentence 
imposed by the court and require each returning ex-prisoner to be supervised 
by the Parole Board.   
 
There is little indication that any of the bills addressing these issues will 
cause a measurable reduction in the prison and jail populations, recidivism or 
the corrections budgets.  Of additional concern is that these bills are devoid, 
for the most part, of full-cost projections or the ancillary costs associated 
with additional supervision caseloads, greater numbers of parolees violating 
conditions of parole, a massive expansion in the length of sentences of 
prisoners serving third superior court convictions, and the growing costs of 
incarcerating an aging prison population that will require support and 
services commensurate with their age and needs.  These bills also do not 
reflect the research or evidence of what is effective in  reducing recidivism 
and stemming the growing costs of corrections.  
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31 percent with the current rate at 23 percent.62  Additionally, Hampden County has been a 
national leader in the implementation of evidence-based reentry practices and this commitment 
has led to not only the reduction of recidivism, but also stable and motivated community-based 
collaborations.  The Hampden County Sheriff’s Department has also implemented a performance 
accountability model63 that applies to staff as well as inmates.  Inmates are expected to 
participate in programs designed to reduce their risk of re-offense.  Staff members are expected 
to assist inmates in participating and succeeding in preparing for reentry and recognize that their 
professional advancement depends on their performance. 
 
Another improved area is the Parole Board.  Parole data show significant progress in the 
percentage of parole applicants being granted parole: 
o In 1998, the parole rate was 46 percent64 
o In 2008, the parole rate was 70 percent65 
Research shows that community supervision using appropriate offender management techniques 
and evidence-based interventions reduces recidivism and improves public safety.  The Parole 
Board recognized that lower-risk offenders unnecessarily sitting in expensive prison cells would 
be better prepared for the community if they had some period of parole supervision prior to 
discharge.  By paroling these offenders earlier than might have been done in previous years, the 
Parole Board was able to improve the preparation for the offender’s return to the community and 
reduce the likelihood that the offender would return to anti-social behavior.  While more people 
are being paroled, they are also succeeding in greater numbers and are discharging from parole 
supervision without incident. 
 
The Parole Board has also made progress in data collection and has recently focused on outcome 
data designed to illuminate the reasons that some inmates do not succeed.  The Parole Board’s 
initiatives, focused on intensive parole for higher risk parolees, housing for parolees, and the 
stability provided by Regional Reentry Centers, have contributed to below average recidivism 
rates for individuals who have been discharged from parole for at least three years.66 
 
The Department of Correction (DOC) has recently implemented evidence-based programs 
throughout its reentry preparation process which use a validated risk/need assessment tool and 
targeted interventions for inmates preparing for reentry.  Not only is this an effective use of 
taxpayer funds but these programs have been shown to reduce recidivism.   
 
The Department is also putting in place a process focused on preparing those offenders most 
likely to re-offend and has collaborated with the Parole Board to integrate parole officers in the 
reentry process so that the transition to the community is as seamless as possible.   
 
Recently, the DOC embarked on an ambitious initiative to improve employment prospects for 
prisoners preparing for release through a combination of services and programs designed to 
diminish the characteristics leading to criminal behavior and skill development and training to 
make them job-ready.  Characteristics such as substance abuse, mental health problems, poor 
family ties, anti-social relationships in the community, and impulsiveness and anger are targeted 
for proven interventions.  Skill development programs are then provided along with connections 
to employers and employment support programs in the communities to which the inmates return 
in order to build a bridge to stability after release.  The Department’s efforts match those in other 
states that have produced a successful transition model and reduced rates of re-offense.   
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The Essex County Sheriff’s Department has recently implemented a reentry preparation process 
focused on improving employment opportunities for ex-offenders.  The process includes basic 
education and soft skill 
development, treatment 
to address substance 
abuse and mental health 
issues, and directed 
training in jobs that are 
available to a recently 
released offender. 
 
While this progress is 
supported by evidence 
of what works to reduce 
victimization and the 
cost of corrections, these 
programs should be 
expanded to reach all 
prisoners who will be 
released and those under 
supervision in the 
community.   
 
Unfortunately, these 
promising and in some 
cases proven programs, 
to reduce re-offending 
and lower prison and jail 
populations, have been affected by recent budget cuts.  The FY10 budget cuts to corrections 
agencies, while comparatively minimal to other state services, have adversely affected the 
programs and services that have the greatest impact on recidivism and public safety.  The 
primary reason for this appears to be the exorbitant fixed costs of maintaining so many 
corrections facilities, the statutory restrictions to moving appropriate inmates to low-security 
facilities and community supervision and the flood of low-risk individuals serving mandatory 
sentences for non-violent offenses.  The Hobson’s Choice for corrections administrators – either 
cut programs and services that ultimately make communities safer or close prisons in the midst 
of significant overcrowding – has left many programs vulnerable.  With little external support, 
the progress made by corrections agencies over the past few years may be in jeopardy. 
 
Boston’s Community Collaboration Model 
 
Using key evidence-based principles, the city of Boston and several public and 
private partners have implemented a safety initiative to reduce the incidence of 
youth violence in Boston’s neighborhoods. 
 
The initiative, called StreetSafe Boston, was conceived and driven by the 
Boston Foundation in conjunction with the City of Boston and a number of key 
organizations.  The initiative involves the collaboration of a unique 
combination of partners; targeting high-risk neighborhoods of the city; and the 
delivery of wraparound services all focused on a very small percentage of the 
population responsible for a majority of the violent crime in the city.   
 
Research has guided the initiative since its inception.  A study by the Harvard 
Kennedy School found that 1 percent of Boston’s youth population drove over 
50 percent of the gun violence.  It found that 70 percent of the shootings were 
concentrated in about 5 percent of the city’s streets and specifically in 5 
neighborhoods.  The initiative then trained street workers familiar with the 
environment to intervene in the lives of these high-risk individuals and it 
reached out to community service providers to participate.  Assessment tools 
are used to identify the high-risk targets of the outreach and street workers meet 
the targeted youth where they are.  By providing safe access to pro-social 
programs as well as connections to workforce, education, housing, family, 
reentry and mental health services, street workers and other community partners 
are able to provide positive, long-term and goal-oriented alternatives to gang 
involvement and anti-social activities.  While focused on high-risk, violent 
youth, this model combines key elements of research-supported best practices 
for community collaborations and should be a model that can be brought to 
scale as well as modified to address older, high-risk individuals. 
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Potential Solutions 
 
With the economic crisis necessitating significant cuts to vital state services and information and 
data obtained from other states that are implementing practices which reduce recidivism, lower 
the cost of corrections and improve public safety, Massachusetts has the ingredients and the 
opportunity to take similar steps.  Principles and practices that should guide a corrections reform 
effort include: 
 
Make the reduction of recidivism the collective goal of the criminal justice system. 
A singular message that the Commonwealth is unified in reducing recidivism.  Because 
recidivism means new victims and additional costs, reducing recidivism must be a priority.   
 
Establish uniform data collection and information sharing.  
“What gets measured gets done.”  This adage should form the foundation of the system’s 
collection and use of data.  Data and information, collected and shared, enables agencies to 
determine whether their approaches are working and what needs improvement.  Uniform data 
collection leads to common operational practices and consistent communication protocols which 
improve efficiency and effectiveness in the criminal justice system.  Data and information also 
provide accountability and transparency to the public when it comes to the use of tax dollars. 
 
Science should guide decision-making. 
Over the last 10 years, extensive research has been conducted about what works and what 
doesn’t work, and what is and is not cost effective, in reducing recidivism.  Research shows that 
the use of assessment tools to identify higher-risk prisoners, the application of evidence-based 
programs targeted to this population that are proven to reduce these risks, and the supervision of 
these individuals by trained parole officers reduces the likelihood that higher-risk ex-prisoners 
will return to criminal activity.  We know what works to reduce recidivism and do not need to 
reinvent the wheel.   
 
Examine laws and practices that restrict access to supervised reentry programs for non-violent 
offenders 
Research shows that prisoners who are supervised in the community and participate in programs 
and services designed to reduce their risk to re-offend are more likely to stay out of trouble after 
their sentences end.  A recent Massachusetts recidivism study found that 20 percent of the 
offenders who recidivated did so within the first six months of release and nearly 50 percent did 
so within the first year of release.67   Yet, more than 40 percent of state prisoners are not 
supervised prior to the end of their sentences.  Most offenders need support and supervision once 
they are released and this is best done through the use of parole practices that assist ex-offenders 
in obtaining housing, treatment and therapy, skill development and employment.  Massachusetts 
must reduce the barriers to supervised support for those individuals most likely to re-offend after 
release. 
 
Collaborate with multiple stakeholders in the communities to which offenders return and use the 
existing community capacity to improve reentry outcomes and reduce the risk of re-offense. 
The urban centers in Massachusetts are fortunate to have a wealth of effective and dedicated 
community service providers that assist those in greatest need or at highest risk.  Some of these 
providers have been effectively engaged as is evident in the StreetSafe Boston model discussed 
earlier in this report and the After Incarceration Support Services model run by the Hampden 
County Sheriff’s Department.  Massachusetts would benefit from a statewide effort that uses  
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these models to link state and municipal efforts with community providers for a more efficient 
and effective community reentry model. 
 
Reconsider allocations that direct significant resources to prison and jail infrastructure and far 
fewer to programs and services that reduce recidivism. 
Research shows that programs and services must be available in the community if reentry is to 
succeed in reducing the risk that an offender will re-offend.  Yet, the inflation adjusted budgets 
for prisons and jails rose more than 12 percent and 20 percent respectively and the probation 
budget rose 163 percent between 1998 and 2008.  Over the same period, the Department of 
Public Health budget, which funds substance abuse programs in the community, shrank 3.3 
percent.  This distribution of resources ignores the research indicating that treatment programs 
and skill development are necessary components in reducing re-offense and victimization. 
 
Direct corrections resources to managing and preparing higher-risk offenders for successful 
transition into the community. 
Higher-risk offenders are just that, offenders more likely to re-offend after release; and most 
high-risk offenders will be released from the corrections system at some point.  Therefore the 
public is far better served if resources are directed to reducing the risk these offenders pose than 
focusing on those who pose minimal risk to re-offend. 
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Conclusion 
 
The economic crisis has forced state and local governments to make changes they would not 
consider making at any other time.  Most of these changes are painful and likely will be 
reconsidered when the fiscal crisis is over.  Yet, many states also are seeing unexpected 
opportunities to implement evidence-based practices throughout their corrections systems.  
These reforms, some triggered by the budget crisis, are nevertheless driven by a need to improve 
effectiveness and efficiency through the implementation of proven practices.  For those states 
that were already moving in this direction, such as Michigan and Connecticut, the budget crisis 
has not been as damaging.  Indeed they are benefiting from data and outcomes that support the 
continuation of innovative policies.   As shown in the case studies in this report, the movement 
toward evidence-based sentencing policy and corrections practices has long-term benefits for 
states and communities, not just short-term benefits for state budgets.  
 
Historically, corrections systems have been nearly impenetrable to research and thoughtful 
policy decision-making.  This has led to massive prison and jail populations in states across the 
country and even larger state corrections budgets.  Sentencing, parole and release policies often 
have been driven by headlines rather than by research into public safety and the reduction of 
victimization.  The economic crisis has offered many state leaders the opportunity to reconsider 
these policies in an effort to control the cost of corrections and improve public safety outcomes.  
In some cases, states have had no choice but to make changes in their systems due to budgetary 
constraints. 
 
In this bleak budget climate we often hear state leaders and advocates for various interest groups 
agreeing that budgets are a statement of a state’s priorities and values.  Whether government is 
cutting vital services or increasing taxes to meet the needs of a state’s residents, there is a 
resounding call for budgeting focused on priorities and on “what works.”  Throughout the 
country, states are deciding whether and how much to reduce funds for schools, health care, 
support services for those most at risk, aid to cities and towns and the preservation of important 
quality of life programs.  State residents deserve value for their tax dollars and many states are 
concluding that government should produce measurable public safety results.   
 
Massachusetts has not been on the leading edge of this issue.  While states across the country are 
reducing prison and jail populations through sentencing reform, instituting earlier parole 
eligibility combined with smart supervision and case management practices, and using new 
approaches to data collection and outcome measures, Massachusetts is considering a bill to 
institute a three-strikes law68 that would significantly increase the prison population for years to 
come, as well as a proposal to spend half a billion dollars to construct new prisons and untold 
millions to operate them.   
 
The economic crisis has been difficult for government leaders at all levels as well as the people 
who rely on government to make ends meet.  Significant cuts in the services that Massachusetts 
prides itself in providing – such as public higher education, public health and support for local 
communities – should trigger reforms in the criminal justice system that make it more effective 
and efficient.  It is essential that Massachusetts policy makers closely examine the costs and 
benefits of our current approach to corrections and reentry, carefully weigh the evidence when it 
comes to proposed changes, and make the right decisions on behalf of the people of the 
Commonwealth.  
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Appendix A 
 
The information in this appendix clarifies the data presented in the figures in this report.  Each 
Figure in the report is numbered and the corresponding data supporting the information is found 
below.§ 
 
 
Figure 1: Percent Change; FY98 and FY08 MA State Budgets – Unadjusted 
Agency FY98 Budget – 
Unadjusted for Inflation 
FY08 Budget FY98 vs. FY08 
Budget Percent Change 
DOC $322,044,967 $478,259,581 48%
County HOC/Sheriffs $286,143,821 $455,417,959 59%
Parole Board $13,194,357 $17,880,679 35%
Probation $20,835,967 $72,341,184* 247%
Higher Education 857,518,588 $1,046,031,207 22% 
Public Health 394,585,891 $503,866,742 28% 
Local Aid 1,025,980,483 $1,343,096,219 31% 
Dept. of Education 2,860,339,721 $4,304,339,932 50% 
*Probation budget adjusted to account for 2004 district court budget transfer of $81 million. Actual 2008 budget is $157,926,086 
 
 
Figure 2: Percent Change; FY98 and FY08 MA State Budgets – Adjusted 
Agency FY98 Budget –  
Adjusted for Inflation 
FY08 Budget FY98 vs. FY08 
Budget Percent Change 
DOC $425,381,887 $478,259,581 12.43% 
County HOC/Sheriffs $377,960,878 $455,417,959 20.49% 
Parole Board $17,428,127 $17,880,679 2.60% 
Probation $27,524,312 $72,341,184* 162.83% 
Higher Education $1,132,676,838 $1,046,031,207 -7.65% 
Public Health $521,199,547 $503,866,742 -3.33% 
Local Aid $1,355,194,331 $1,343,096,219 -0.89% 
Dept. of Education $3,778,157,810 $4,304,339,932 13.93% 
*Probation budget adjusted to account for 2004 district court budget transfer of $81 million. Actual 2008 budget is $157,926,086 
 
 
Figure 3: MA Inmate Growth: Prison System, 1980, 1995, 2008 
Data found in Massachusetts Department of Correction publications for Third Quarter of 1980 
and of 1995, Quarterly Report on the Status of Prison Overcrowding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
§ Citation and reference information for the data in these tables is found in Appendix B. 
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Figure 4: Percent Change; Incarcerated/Supervised Population and Budget, 1998 vs. 2008 
Agency 1998 Population 2008 Population ’98 vs. ’08 Population 
Percent Change 
DOC 10,915 11,400 4% 
County HOC/Sheriffs 12,531 13,965 11% 
Parole 8,326 7,893 -5% 
Probation 121,295 138,443 14% 
DOC – Figures are average daily population from 3rd Q 1998 and 2008  
HOC – Figures are average daily population from 3rd Q 1998 and 2008 
Parole – Figures are total annual caseload 
Probation – 2008 number does not include 80,507 cases on administrative supervision from district court transfer in 2004 or 
Family and Probate category  
 
 
Figure 5: 2010 MA State Budget Cuts 
Agency FY2009 Budget*** FY2010 Budget Percent Change 
DOC 534,873,622 524,327,622 -1.97% 
County HOC/Sheriffs 478,229,836 436,013,824 -8.83% 
Parole Board 19,255,248 18,789,506 -2.42% 
Probation 169,464,542 155,331,833 -8.34% 
Higher Education* 1,096,733,749 907,175,073 -17.28% 
Public Health 545,744,442 471,479,466 -13.61% 
Local Aid** 1,345,096,219 963,646,140 -28.36% 
Social Services 831,477,528 786,259,603 -5.44% 
Dept. of Education 4,566,389,225 4,314,916,033 -5.51% 
Budgets do not include retained revenue line items.  FY2010 budgets do not include vetoes or overrides 
* Does not include $155,939,201 in ARRA funds.  Including these funds, higher education will decrease by 3.07% in FY10. 
** Does not include potential ARRA funds.  Including the potential $167,649,347 ARRA funding, local aid will decrease by 
15.89% in FY10. Local Aid budget does not include Chapter 70 allocation. 
***General Appropriation 
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Appendix B 
 
Budget Reference Information 
 
This page serves as a reference and citation section for the budget data found in the report.  What 
would have been cited in footnotes in the narrative of the report is found in this section due to the 
repetition of the budget data discussed in the report.  The data is presented in chronological order 
beginning with the most recent budget information discussed in the report. 
 
Fiscal Year 2010 budget information –  
House 4129, An Act Making Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 2010 for the 
Maintenance of the Departments, Boards, Commissioners, Institutions and Certain 
Activities of the Commonwealth, For Interest, Sinking Fund and Serial Bond 
Requirements and for Certain Permanent Improvements.  The Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts (June 2009). 
(The budget data in the report does not include vetoes made by the Governor or overrides 
voted on by the legislature) 
Found at http://www.mass.gov/legis/ht04129.pdf   
 
Fiscal Year 2009 budget information –  
Chapter 182 of the Acts of 2008, An Act Making Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 2009 
for the Maintenance of the Departments, Boards, Commissioners, Institutions and 
Certain Activities of the Commonwealth, For Interest, Sinking Fund and Serial Bond 
Requirements and for Certain Permanent Improvements.  The Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts (July 2008). 
Found at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw08/sl080182.htm  
 
Fiscal Year 2008 budget information –  
Chapter 61 of the Acts of 2007, An Act Making Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 2008 
for the Maintenance of the Departments, Boards, Commissioners, Institutions and 
Certain Activities of the Commonwealth, For Interest, Sinking Fund and Serial Bond 
Requirements and for Certain Permanent Improvements.  The Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts (July 2007). 
Found at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw07/sl070061.htm  
  
Fiscal Year 1998 budget information –  
Chapter 43 of the Acts of 1997, Fiscal Year 1998 Budget.  Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts (July 1997). 
Found at http://www.mass.gov/legis/senate/98budget/contents.htm  
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Appendix C 
 
Offender Reentry Flow Chart 
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Sentencing – the beginning of the 
reentry process. Sentencing has 
significant impact on the ability of 
corrections officials to prepare 
prisoners for reentry. Decisions that 
allow for diversion from prison or jail, 
placement in a treatment center or a 
sentence  enabling an earlier parole 
decision recognize that not all 
offenders require a long period of 
incarceration and that reentry can start 
earlier with better results. Restrictive 
sentencing policies such as mandatory 
minimum drug sentences limit 
appropriate sentencing decisions and 
sound preparation by corrections 
professionals.   
 
Assessing inmate’s risks and 
needs – to understand the 
problems that led an individual to 
prison, the system must know the 
kind of risk they pose and what 
their needs are in order to 
minimize that risk. Therefore, 
upon intake a validated risk 
assessment tool should measure 
the prisoner’s risk of committing 
another crime and evaluate the 
factors that created the risk.  
Assessments should be done 
periodically as the individual 
moves through the system to 
gauge the progress and evolving 
needs of the offender at different 
intervals. 
Targeting interventions – the job of the 
correctional system is to reduce the risk 
prisoners pose to the community.  The 
risk/needs assessment tool gives 
corrections officials the information to 
target those risk factors that can be 
mitigated.  Interventions such as 
programs addressing substance abuse, 
lack of educational attainment and 
employment skills, and antisocial 
attitudes must be targeted to those with 
these deficits who are a higher risk to re-
offend.  The programs must be those that 
research has shown to be effective in 
mitigating these risks.  In a national 
study only about 10% of the programs 
reviewed attained the highest levels of 
effectiveness.  
Planning for discharge – every 
prisoner who will return to the street 
should have a reentry plan.  The 
development of the reentry plan 
should begin once the individual’s 
risk/needs assessment and 
intervention plan is determined.  The 
plan should incorporate the 
intervention programs, the ongoing 
needs of the prisoner as he or she 
moves through the system, the likely 
factors that will be present in the 
individual’s life upon return to the 
community and information on 
managing each of these.  The plan 
should be collaborative and multi-
disciplinary and should address 
preparation for release, terms and 
conditions of release, and post-release 
supervision and services.  The other 
supervisory agencies, parole and 
probation, should be part of the 
creation of the reentry plan and should 
actively participate in the transition 
from prison to the community. 
Classification and step-down – 
as prisoners move through the 
system, they should be housed in 
facilities appropriate to their risk 
level and their programmatic 
needs. Their classification levels 
must be adjusted to reflect their 
diminishing levels of risk related 
to incarceration so that they can 
be appropriately transferred to 
facilities where the transition to 
the community is more seamless.  
Pre-release facilities and work-
release facilities provide 
programs that are unavailable in 
medium or high security facilities 
and prepare the individual much 
better for the transition to the 
community. 
 
Post-release supervision and 
support – More than 40% of the 
prisoners released from the 
Department of Correction are 
unsupervised upon release.  Worse, 
83% (in 2002) of the prisoners 
released from a maximum security 
prison to the community do not have 
parole supervision.  Thus inmates 
who pose the greatest threat to the 
community upon release are the 
least likely to be supervised.  
Research shows that supervision 
and services are a necessary 
component of an individual’s 
successful reentry.  Support services 
must coincide with supervision in 
the community in order to continue 
to address the individual’s risk 
factors that are likely to lead to re-
offending.  Model programs 
combine collaborations with key 
community stakeholders with 
wraparound service delivery. 
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Offender Reentry: Key Elements of Each Step 
 
 
→
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
→
Sentencing –  
• Give the judiciary greater 
authority to impose non-
mandatory sentences, within 
guidelines, for drug offenses 
• Increase diversion programs as 
an option for judges to impose 
rather than incarceration 
• Reduce parole eligibility periods 
for non-violent individuals  
• Restore earned compliance 
credits to encourage good 
behavior and program 
participation and enable lower-
risk prisoners to transition to the 
community.  
Assessing prisoner’s risks and 
needs – 
• Risk assessment used 
throughout incarceration to 
assess program application 
and accomplishments 
• The same risk assessment 
tool used by the DOC, 
sheriffs, parole and 
probation 
• Risk assessment tool 
should be used to 
determine level of 
supervision and types of 
interventions for 
individuals on probation 
and parole.  
Targeting –  
• Implement programs that 
have been proven effective to 
reduce re-offense 
• Programs should be directed 
toward higher risk prisoners, 
those more likely to reoffend 
when released, in order to 
reduce recidivism 
• Prisoners must be induced to 
participate and allowed to 
complete programs they are 
participating in 
• Create reentry housing for 
those prisoners participating 
in programs and preparing 
for life in the community. 
Planning for discharge –  
• Create reentry plan committee in 
each facility 
• Create collaborations between 
the DOC, each facility and 
supervising agency, and the 
community programs that will 
participate in the individual’s 
continuation of care after release 
• Bring employers into the 
facilities  who are likely to 
consider hiring recently released 
individuals to assist in skills 
training programs (soft and hard 
skills), conduct job fairs and 
network with prisoners preparing 
for release 
• Ensure that prisoners understand 
the plan and what is expected 
throughout their incarceration 
and as they transfer to parole. 
Classification and step-down –  
• Objectively classify all 
prisoners in DOC custody 
without regard for where 
they are currently housed 
• Determine whether the 
DOC facilities’ security 
levels match the needs of 
the prisoner security levels 
based on the objective 
classification 
• Ensure that a prisoner’s 
custody level match his or 
her placement 
• Create broader 
collaboration with HOCs to 
receive prisoners who will 
soon discharge to the 
HOC’s community 
Post-release supervision and 
support – 
A returning prisoner should have: 
• an identification, health 
insurance, resume of 
accomplishments while in 
custody, copy of accurate 
CORI, contacts for employment 
and housing providers in their 
community, contacts who can 
guide their immediate post-
incarceration decision making 
•  housing, even if temporary  
• a job lined up or at least 
employer contacts 
• a mentor for the first couple 
weeks, at least, of the transition 
• ability to communicate quickly 
with supervisor or someone that 
can help  
• a network of community 
partners capable of supporting 
the person’s success 
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